Abstract. As a generalisation of clock-controlled shift registers, we consider a class of key-stream generators where a clocking sequence is used to control a "pseudorandom" walk on a finite group. 
Introduction
Cascades of clock-controlled shift registers have been extensively studied as candidates for secure key-stream generators [2] . It is possible to regard any clockcontrolled shift register used in this scheme as a finite state machine whose states are the elements of a finite cyclic group of order equal to the period of the register (see Section 2 for details). In this paper, we generalise this construction to the case where an arbitrary finite group is used as state space of each component of the cascade. Our motivation for this generalisation is twofold. Firstly since many finite groups can be implemented efficiently in both hardware and software, it is realistic to hope that some of the new generators constructed will be useful in practice. Secondly, the broader perspective gained should improve our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the generators currently in use.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a description of our generalisation of a clock-controlled shift register. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the design criteria for such generators when used in a cascade. Next, we present some simple examples of our construction and discuss the statistical properties and security of their output sequences. Finally, we set out our conclusions and suggest areas for further research.
The basic setup
A (clock-controlled) group generator consists of the following three components:
(1) A control generator C producing a periodic binary clocking sequence (c~), _>0 of least period 7. (2) A finite group G = (go, gl) generated by two elements go and gt. (3) An output function f: G --~ GF (2) .
The control generator may be any finite state machine which produces a binary output, e.g., an LFSR or a cascade of clock-controlled group generators. This allows us to build cascades from very simple group generators.
The clocking sequence is used to control a walk on the group G as follows. In each step, we move from g E G to ggo if the next bit of the clocking sequence is 0 or to ggl otherwise. Starting with the identity of G, this defines the state sequence (qi)i>>_o of our generator:
q-1 := 1
qi := qi-lgc~ (i > O)
Hence qi = gco "gcl "" "gc~. In each step, the generator computes an output bit si by applying f to the current state:
We note that clock-controlled LFSRs are a special case of our construction: Let G = (g) be cyclic of order 2 t -1 and choose a pair (go = 9~~ = g~) generating G. For fixed 0 # fl, c~ E GF(21), where a is a primitive element of GF(2I), define the output function f by f(ge) := Tr(flae).
The resulting generator is a clock-controlled LFSR that is stepped by e0 or el steps according to the clocking sequence. In particular, setting go = 1 yields the well-known stop-and-go generator.
We will end this section by giving a simple example of a non-abelian group generator: Let G = $3 = ((123), (12)) be the symmetric group of order 6 and define the output function f by {(1), (23), (12)} ~ 0, {(123), (132), (13)} ~ 1.
Clocked by the m-sequence 0111010... of period 7, we obtain the following pseudorandom sequence of least period 21:
This sequence has periodic linear complexity 18 and a good run length distribution.
3
The state sequence
It seems hard to prove general properties of the output sequence (si) produced by a clock-controlled group generator since these strongly depend on the chosen output function f. In this section, we are going to analyse the state sequence (qi) of a clock-controlled group generator, which does not depend on the output function f.
PERIOD. First, we determine the least period p of the state sequence (qi). Recall that 7 denotes the least period of the 'clocking sequence.
Lemma 1. p = V 9 ord(q), where q := q7-t = go0 "gel ' 9 .. 9 g~-l.
Proof. Siffce the clocking sequence (ci) can be reconstructed from the state sequence (qi), p equals the least period of the sequence of pairs (ci, qi), which is easy to determine: Obviously, it is a multiple of 7. By definition of q, we have
qkT-1 -~ qk for k E N. Hence the sequence (ci, qi) has minimal period 17, where
To apply this lemma, we have to find the order of q. In general, there seems to be no better way than explicitly computing q from one cycle of the clocking sequence. However, this is not necessary in some special cases: Modulo its derived subgroup G', G is a two-generator abelian group 9 The coset of G ~ containing q is uniquely determined by the number of zeroes and ones in one cycle of the clocking sequence. Hence the minimum order of an element of this coset is a lower bound on the ord(q). See Sections 5 and 6 for examples.
STATES REACHED. Next, we ask how many times each state occurs in one period of (qi). In particular, we would like to know whether the sequence contains all possible states. Our intuition is that for good statistical properties of the output sequence, the state sequence should hit every element of G about equally often.
From the definition of q, it is clear that qi+7 = qqi for all i. 
4
The output function
The choice of the output function f is crucial for our generator's performance. Of the 2 Icl possible output functions, we should choose one that -is easy and fast to evaluate, -guarantees high period and linear complexity of the output sequence, -yields an output sequence with good statistical properties and -disguises the group structure of the generator as much as possible.
For cryptographic applications, there should be a sufficient number of good output functions for a given generator so the choice of f can be used as (part of) a secret key.
Our ultimate goal is to find an efficient algorithm which when given a suitable group G and generators go,g1, finds a set of good output functions. As this appears to be beyond our reach at the moment, we will discuss some properties that we consider desirable. Firstly, we consider how to choose f such that the output sequence has large period c~. Obviously, cr divides the period p = 7ord(q) of the state sequence. How can we make sure that ~ has the maximum possible value p? A counting argument shows that if the set Q of states reached by the state sequence is large enough, then c~ = p for most choices of f. However, this is not very helpful since we have to construct a suitable output function that has additional properties.
Hence we will try to find (simple) conditions on f that guarantee the maximal possible period cr = p. PROPERTY 1. The least common multiple of the least periods of all sequences
Since these sequences are all shifted decimations of (si) by 7, Property 1 is a necessary condition for cr = p = 7ord(q) according to Lemma We want our output sequence to contain about same number of zeroes and ones. Property 2 guarantees this if we assume that the state sequence hits every element of G equally often.
If the output sequence is to be cryptographically secure, it is desirable that deducing any information about the state sequence from the output sequence should be difficult. Thus f should disguise the group structure as much as possible. Otherwise, the generator is equivalent to one based on the smaller factor group G/N. In particular, f or its complement should not be group homomorphisms.
In fact, if a close approximation to f fails Property 3, then f is also a poor choice because then the generator can be approximated by a smaller one.
We now introduce a much stronger property, which is easily seen to imply Property 3. To see why this requirement makes sense, suppose that for some g C G, f(z) = f(z9) for significantly more (or less) than half of all z E G. Then for all positions i < j with qj = qig, sj can be predicted by si (resp. its complement), with high probability. Such correlations could also be used to gain information about the state sequence from the output sequence. Hence for cryptographic strength of our generator, f should -at least approximately -have Property 4. Functions satisfying Property 4 have been studied in the case when G is an elementary abelian 2-group under the name of bent functions [5] . By analogy with this case, we say a function f is bent if it satisfies Property 4.
Unfortunately, bent functions do not exist for all groups and are never completely balanced: since because f is bent, )-'~zeG t(z, y) = 0 for any y # 1. Secondly,
Thus n = (n -2z) 2 and hence n is a square and z = (n + v~)/2. The theorem follows, since clearly n must be even.
It is not clear whether bent functions exist for every group whose order is an even square, nor do we know how to find them efficiently. If G is an elementary abelian 2-group, efficient constructions of bent functions are well known, see [5] . For small examples of non-abelian groups, we have found bent functions by exhaustive search. However, this approach is not feasible unless G is very small, say IGI _< 25. The fact that bent functions are not perfectly balanced does not seem to be a problem in practice since if a balanced function is desired, we can complement an appropriate number of bits to produce a balanced function which still has reasonable correlation properties. Even if no bent function exists for a given group, we can search for "approximately bent" functions.
Despite their good correlation properties, we are not sure that bent functions are the ideal choice for cryptographically secure output functions. Because the property of being bent is so strong, it may well force extra structure upon the function which can be exploited in an attack. Some experimental evidence of such phenomena is presented in Sections 5 and 6. However, the structures we found would only exhibit themselves over long segments of the sequence, so they might not be detectable in practical situations.
5
Example 1: The quaternion group generator
In this section, we will have a closer look at a group generator based on the group of quaternions. THE GENERATOR. In the notation of our basic setup, choose
the quaternion group of order 8 with generators g0 := i and gl := j.
STATE SEQUENCE. Modulo the commutator subgroup G r = {1,-1}, the generators commute and have order 2. Hence the coset of G r containing a state qi is uniquely determined by the number of zeroes and ones in the first i bits of the clocking sequence. Since all elements of G \ G ~ have order 4, we know that the state q reached after a full period of the clocldng sequence has order 4 iff one cycle of (ci) contains an odd number of zeroes or ones, or both. In this case, the state sequence has period a = 47. From now on, suppose that the clocking sequence has least period 7 = 2k
and odd weight. Then it is clear that q = +ij has order 4, so the state sequence has period p = 47 = 2 k+2. We claim that the state sequence hits every element of G the same number of times in each cycle. To see this, look at the subgroup generated by q:
Since U has index 2 in G and does not contain the generators go = i and gq = j, the state sequence alternates between elements of U and elements of the coset iU = jU = G \ U. Since 7 is even, it follows by Lemma 2 that every group element is reached exactly 7/2 times in one cycle of the state sequence.
OUTPUT FUNCTION. Next, we have to choose a suitable output function f satisfying Properties 1-4 of Section 4. Since 8 is not a square, no bent functions on G exist according to Theorem 4, so we have looked for functions that have Properties 1-3 and are approximately bent. By exhaustive search using the group theory package GAP [3] , we have found the following 8 best candidates for f that look very much alike. If we use one of these output functions, the resulting binary output sequence of our generator has least period ~r = p = 47 by Lemma 3. Since this is a power of 2, the linear complexity of the sequence is at least half the period according to Lemma 8. a 9 b, b, ~) . The output function can be implemented by a lookup table or a few boolean gates. In this implementation, we can expect our generator to be about as fast as a 3-bit LFSR.
1-1j -j i-i ij -ij
CASCADES. Since one quaternion group generator is too small to be useful in practice, we are interested in cascading them. If we can make sure that the clocking input of each generator in the cascade has odd weight, we know that the period and linear complexity of our sequence is increased by a factor of 4 in each stage. Unfortunately, the ~)utput of our generator has even weight since the output function has weight 4 and every group element is reached the same number of times. A simple (but cryptographically questionable) way to overcome this difficulty is to change one output bit in each cycle of each stage. When building cascades of LFSR, it is common to add the input of each stage to its output. Our experiments indicate that that the sequences obtained from cascades of quaternion group generators have better statistical properties if we do this as well.
For cryptographic applications, a key of three bits per stage can be used to choose one of the 8 output functions fl,-9 fs in each stage.
EXPERIMENTS. We have implemented a cascade of quaternion group generators in software using the group theory system GAP [3] . Each stage uses the output function fl from the table above and adds its input to its output. Between the stages, the first output bit is changed to guarantee that all clocking sequence in the cascade have odd weight. Clocking a four-stage cascade with the sequence (1, 0, 0, 0), we obtain the following sequences: For all nonnegative integers k, the k-error linear complexity of a binary sequence is defined to be the smallest linear complexity that can be obtained by changing at most k bits of the sequence. The k-error linear complexity is an important indicator for the security of pseudorandom sequences: a sequence that has high linear complexity but is close to a sequence with low linear complexity, such as (0n 1), is cryptographieally weak. See [6] for an algorithm which calculates the k-error complexity of a binary sequence of period 2 n. The k-error linear complexity of our sequence looks as follows: Note that the linear complexity drops down to 514 if a single error is allowed. This happens because we changed one bit of the output sequence in order to give it odd weight. So in fact, the output sequence has linear complexity 514 which is quite close to the minimum value 512 from Lemma 8 and certainly far from the expected value of 1023 for a random sequence. This indicates that the sequence might have some hidden structure. From the distinctive low values at shifts of 256 and 768, it can bee seen that the sequence has some global structure. In fact, we found the following symmetries: If the first half of the sequence is XORed to the second, we obtain (except for the first bit which was changed in the output) the alternating sequence 0101 .... This problem is caused by the output function: A shift of 512 = 27 in the state sequence is equivalent to multiplication by q2 = _ 1. Since f(-g) equals f(g) if g E (q) and f(g) otherwise, the sequence (s~ | s~+512)i>0 ~ alternates between 0 and 1.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC STRENGTH. Our sequence has sufficiently large period and linear complexity, a good local linear complexity profile and a good run length distribution. Unfortuflately, it shows some strong correlations over large distances, and will thus be cryptographically weak if large portions of the sequence are used. However, the experiments indicate that the sequence is quite secure if only segments up to length 256 are used. In a similar way, we can define a group generator using the quaternion group of order 16. derived subgroup G p = (k ~, h2}, the two gener-2. The group G contains four elements of order 8, which form the coset goglG' = {k, kh 2, k 3, k3h2}. Hence q has order 8 iff one period of the clocking sequence contains an odd number of zeroes and an odd number of ones. In this case, the state sequen~ e has least period 87.
The same argument as in Section 5 can be used to show that the state sequence hits every element of G the same number of times in one cycle.
OUTPUT FUNCTION. Again, we used GAP to search for a suitable output function. As the order of G is a square, bent functions on G may exist. By Theorem 4, such bent functions will not be balanced, but have either 6 or 10 zeroes. By exhaustive search, we have found 128 bent functions on G with 10 zeroes. The complements of these functions are the bent functions of G with 6 zeroes. Of these bent functions, we used the following as output function for the experiments: ~~1~o~1~1~o~1~11~1~1~1~  ~~G~1~1~1~1~~11~oo~11~1~1~o~o~1~  ~1~o~o~lo~o~O~1~11~1~o~1~1~1~oo~o~1~oo~o1~1~1~  ~111~1~o~~1~1~1~1~O~1~1~1~1~~1~~o~1~  o~~o~o~1~1~1~o~1~o~o1~o~o~1o~o~ooo~o1~o~o~1~o~o~o  ~G~1~~o~G1~o~o~o~1~oo~oo~o1Io~11~1~1~  ~o~G~~1~11~11~1~1~1~o~oo~11~oo111~1o~  ~1~1~o~oo~o~oo~o~ooo~1~1~11~~11~11~1~~  ~O~o~o~1o1~o~o~o~1~1~O~o~1~o~1o~ooo~1~oo~  ~o~o~11~11~1~o1G~1ooo~o~o~1~1~~~lo~o~oo~G~1~  ~1~1~~1~o~o~I~~o~o~o~1~1~~  ~o1~l~1~1~1~11~~1~~1~1~1~oo~  ~I~o~1~o~1~oo~1~1~o~oo1~1~o~o1~1o~o~o1o~1~  ~1~o~1~o~o~o~1~1~o~o~oo~1~1o~o~oo~o~o1oo~o~1~oo~1~  ~O~oi~11~1~1~G~1~1~o1o~1~o~oo~o~o~1~o~1~o~1o~o~G~  ~1o1~1~o~G~1~1~1~o~1~1~1oo~IG~G~I~11o1~o~1~1~  ~~1~i~~1l~1~~1~1G~~1~  ~o~1~1~1~o~oo~o~1~o~l~11o~~l~1~  11~o~1~oo11~o1o~1~o~o~1~l~o~o1~o~oo~~o~Io~1~1~Io~  ~o~1~o~~o11~I~o~1~o~1~oo~o~o~o~1~~o~o1~  ~~Q~11~~G~1~o1~1~o~1~1~1o~oo~oo~  ~1~~O~~o1o~11~~1~~o1~~1~1~  ~1~1oo~1o1~1~111~o~1~o~1~~1~o~o~oo~1~1~  ~9~O~1~1~1~1~11~o~11~1~1~1~  ~ol~o~1~I~o~1~1~oo~o~1o~O~~1~1~  ~~o~o1~1~1~o1~G~o~oo~1~11~1~1~1~o~1~1~o1o~  ~o~1~1~11~l~~1~oo~1~1~1~1~1~o~oo~o~  ~I~1~o~1~11~~G~1o~~1O~1~  ~o1~1~1~11~1~o~o~o~o~G~1~1o~Go~o~o~oo~o~o~G~  ~~o~o~1o~o~ooo~1~1~oo~o~o~o~1~1~1~oG1~o~o  ~o~1~~~o~1o~1~1~1~1~o~I11~1~1~11~o~1~o~11  ~1~11o~1~1~1~~1~1o~o~1~1~~1~G~o~ooo~1~  ~o~1o~oo~o~o~1~1~O11~1~o~1~o~I~1~1~o1~1~  ~1~o~1~1~oo1~1~~o~~lo~oo1~11~11  1~1~GO~1~1~1~1~~o~ooo~1~1~o~111~  ~o~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~1~O~1~1~oo~1~  ~G~G~O~11~o~o~~1~11~1~o~1~1~o~o~I~o  ~11~1~1~11~I1~o~1~~~1~o~1~1~1~1~ In this paper, we have generalised the notion of a clock controlled shift register to that of a register based on a finite group. We have shown how these registers can be cascaded to produce sequences of high period and linear complexity. Are the sequences produced by these cascades cryptographically secure ? As pointed out in the sections above, the sequences produced by our generators do exhibit some structure. This structure certainly makes the use of especially long segments of the sequences unwise. However, if we suppose that only a portion of a period of the output sequence is used, the structures detailed in the previous sections do not seem to affect the security of the sequence since they involve terms of the output sequence that are very widely spaced. Since the local linear complexity profiles and run length distribution of the output sequences seem good, we have an indication that the sequences are secure when segments of reasonable length are used.
How can we maximise the assurance of security that our system gives ? The system depends on a careful choice of the output function of each generator in our cascade. We need to develop and expand the criteria given in Section 4. In particular, should we choose the output function to be bent? Maybe a function which only approximately satisfies the bent property but which performs better under other criteria is more appropriate. Further research -both experimental and theoretical -is needed on this matter. Is the form of the cascade we have used the most secure possible ? For example, we assume that the input to each stage is XORed with the output of the register. This operation seems to greatly improve the run length distribution of final output over that of a similar cascade with the XOR operation removed. Why is this, and can a different operation be introduced which increases the security of the output of the cascade ?
We believe that the concept of a bent function over a finite group is of interest in its own right, irrespective of its application in the situation outlined here. Do bent functions exist over any group whose order is an even square ? Certainly plenty of bent functions exist over the groups we have examined. Can large families of bent functions be constructed over certain families of groups ? The only constructions known so far apply only when the group is an elementary abelian 2-group.
In summary, the sequences produced by cascades of generators based on finite groups provide an interesting generalisation of the standard cascades of shift registers which can often be efficiently implemented. The output of such generators can have guaranteed minimum period and linear complexity. Experiments indicate that the sequences also have good linear complexity profiles and autocorrelation properties. However, further work is needed to establish that the sequences produced by cascades of this type are secure.
8 Appendix: well-known facts on period and linear complexity For the convenience of the reader, this section contains a collection of well-known facts about period and linear complexity of binary sequences. These have been used in the proofs throughout this paper. 
